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Since Brazil's adoption of a universal health care policy in 1988, the country's health care has been
delivered by a mix of private providers and free public providers. We examine whether income-based
disparities in medical care usage still exist after the development of the public network using a nationally
representative sample of over 46,000 Brazilians from 2003. We find robust evidence of a positive
association between income and doctor visits, private doctor visits, and private medical expenditures.
Interestingly, we also find a pro-rich disparity in public doctor visits that disappears after including
local area fixed effects to account for variation in availability and quality of medical services across
localities. We then estimate the income elasticity of private medical expenditures to be well below
one, suggesting that private care remains a necessity despite the availability of free public care. These
results suggest that the public health care system in Brazil is not effectively reaching the segments
of the population that need it most.
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cjcourte@uncg.edu1 Introduction and Background
In 1988, Brazil adopted a universal health care policy that created a network of public
providers to deliver a full range of health services free of charge. Subsequently, the govern-
ment expanded the public network and created the Family Health Program (Programa Saœde
da Fam￿lia; PSF), which assigns a team composed of a doctor, a nurse, a nurse￿ s assistant
and several health workers to provide free health care to all families in a particular area. This
paper presents evidence that signi￿cant income-based disparities in health care utilization ￿
in both the private and public sectors ￿exist in Brazil despite the country￿ s commitment to
universal health care. We also estimate the income elasticity of private medical expenditures
and conclude that private sector care remains a necessity.
Brazil￿ s health care system consists of both public and private sub-systems. The public
system ￿called sistema œnico de saœde (SUS) ￿was created and de￿ned in the Federal Con-
stitution of 1988 and the 1990 Organic Health Law. Three main principles of universality,
integrality, and decentralization guide the system. Universality means that health care is
a universal right; it is the state￿ s duty to provide health care to all citizens free of charge.
Integrality means that public health assistance must comprise primary, secondary, and ter-
tiary levels of care. Decentralization means that the management and organization of health
services is the responsibility of the municipalities.
Brazil is the ￿fth largest country in the world in both land area and population, and the
SUS is one of the world￿ s largest public health care systems. Its ambulatory system consists of
56,640 units and assists 350 million cases annually, while 6,493 hospitals and 487,058 hospital
beds are part of the SUS network. In 2001, the SUS conducted 250 million consultations,
200 million laboratory tests, and 70 million high complexity procedures (Rehem de Souza,
2002).1 The SUS network consists of a mix of public, non-pro￿t, and for-pro￿t providers,
but all services are paid by the federal, state, and municipal governments (Uga and Santos,
1High complexity procedures include tomography, magnetic resonance imaging, hemodialysis, and
chemotherapy sessions.
22007).
The private health care system ￿called sistema suplementar de saœde (SSS) ￿comprises
those private institutions that do not belong to the SUS. Patients are responsible for their
own medical bills in the private system. Individual and group health insurance plans are
available to help defray the costs, but coverage rates are low.2 Though only 20% of the
population participates in the SSS, it accounts for approximately half of the country￿ s medical
expenditures.
Brazil exhibits striking geographic variation in both health and access to health care.
The infant mortality rate of 35.5 per 1,000 in the Northeast ￿the country￿ s least economi-
cally developed region ￿is more than double the rate of 15.6 per 1,000 in the country￿ s most
developed region the Southeast. Endemic and transmittable diseases are notoriously persis-
tent in the less developed North, Northeast and Center-West regions (Pan American Health
Organization, 2008). In some states, more than 50% of all registered deaths are attributed
to uncertain causes, potentially re￿ ecting a lack of health care services (Lobato, 2000).
Access to SUS hospitals varies widely between municipalities. Wherever the population is
highly concentrated (typically wealthier areas), several hospitals are present and the average
distance from households to their closest establishment is short. Where population groups
are scattered along a extensive territory (typically poorer areas), hospitals are scarce and
obtaining care usually requires traveling long distances. Figure 1 illustrates this discrepancy
by showing the distribution of hospitals a¢ liated with the SUS network in the northeastern
state of Bahia.3 Despite their large land area, most municipalities in the northwestern area
2There are four types of health insurance plans: self-managed health plans, prepaid group practice plans,
medical cooperative plans, and health insurance company plans. Self-managed health plans o⁄er services
for the employees of a given ￿rm. Prepaid group practice plans (17 million enrollees) o⁄er di⁄erent services,
depending on the contract signed. The services may be through a network of facilities and professionals
or free choice with reimbursement. Medical cooperative plans (10 million enrollees) are similar to prepaid
group practices but the health services are strictly from a network of facilities and professionals. Health
insurance company plans (6 million enrollees) consist of free choice of professionals and facilities combined
with reimbursement to the user (Lobato, 2000).
3Bahia is fourth and ￿fth among Brazilian states in terms of population and territory, respectively. Its
economy represents a 5% of Brazil￿ s total GDP, which makes it the richest state in the northeastern region
(http://www.sidra.ibge.gov.br).
3of the state have 6 or fewer hospitals, while much smaller municipalities in the eastern area
of the state have 16 or more hospitals.
These geographic di⁄erences highlight the need for empirical research to examine whether
Brazil￿ s public health care network is adequately reaching those in need. As a whole, the
literature to date suggests that universal health care coverage in Brazil has improved health
but that the extent of public sector provision remains insu¢ cient. Macinko et al. (2006 and
2007), Rasella et al. (2010), and Morsch et al. (2001) documented a negative association
between PSF coverage and infant or ￿ve-year mortality rates. However, in a study of health
expenditure that also includes dental care and medicines, Xu et al. (2003) found that Brazil
had the second-highest prevalence of catastrophic medical expenditures out of 59 countries
despite the availability of free public care. Rodriguez et al. (2009) found that less than
half of elderly individuals with chronic conditions had a medical visit in the preceding six
months. Using a sample of elderly individuals from southern Brazil, Bos (2007) estimated a
positive relationship between the number of public outpatient clinics in a municipality and
residents￿probability of using the public system. Goldbaum et al. (2005) compared two
areas of Sªo Paulo City and found that disparities in health care utilization on the bases of
income and education were more evident in the area that was not covered by the PSF. Barros
and Bertoldi (2008) examined a sample of 869 households and found that the proportion of
income spent on private health services was similar across economic groups. In a study of
the northeastern state of CearÆ, where PSF covers practically the whole population, Maciel
et al. (2010) show that the need of physicians to have multiple jobs is a major obstacle to
SUS e¢ cacy.
We contribute to this growing literature in three ways.4 First, to our knowledge we are
the ￿rst to use a large nationally representative sample to test for income-based disparities
in health care utilization in Brazil. Second, we examine whether these disparities are purely
4More broadly, we contribute to the extensive literatures on disparities in health care utilization and the
income elasticity of health care. See Wagsta⁄ and Van Doorslaer (2000), Goddard and Smith (2001), and
Rannan-Eliya and Somanathan (2006) for reviews of the former. See Gerdtham and Jonsson (2000) and
Getzen (2000) for reviews of the latter.
4driven by di⁄erences in the private sector or whether disparities exist in the free public sector
as well. Third, we compute an estimate of the income elasticity of private sector medical
expenditures in Brazil, which provides an objetive measure of whether private health care is
a luxury or necessity.
We estimate a positive relationship between income and doctor visits, private doctor
visits, and private medical expenditures that persists even after including demographic,
health, living condition, and religion controls as well as state or local area ￿xed e⁄ects.
Interestingly, we also ￿nd evidence of a positive association between income and public
doctor visits that persists after adding the control variables but becomes negative when we
include local area ￿xed e⁄ects. This is consistent with the pro-rich disparity in public sector
utilization being driven by di⁄erences in medical care access and quality between rich and
poor areas. Additionally, we estimate the income elasticity of private medical expenditures
of well below one, so private care remains a necessity in Brazil despite the availability of
free public care. Together, these results suggest that the public health care system in Brazil
is not e⁄ectively reaching everyone. More broadly, our ￿ndings underscore the di¢ culty
of implementing a universal health care system in a country with an extensive geographic
territory.
2 Data
We use the publicly available 2003 Pesquisa de Or￿amentos Familiares (POF; Survey of
Family Budget), a nationally representative dataset of 48,470 households collected by the
Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics. The survey contains detailed information
on all types of income and expenditure in a one year period, as well as socioeconomic and
demographic characteristics of the household members. Health expenditures are divided into
two broad categories: pharmacy and health care access. Our analysis focuses on the latter,
and more speci￿cally expenditures on medical visits. For each medical visit, the survey
5speci￿es the type of doctor, amount spent, payment method, and type of provision. Type
of provision includes public sector, health insurance company (HIC), or private agent other
than a HIC.5
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the income and medical variables. Table 2
presents summary statistics for the demographic, health, living condition, and religion vari-
ables used as controls in our analysis. After dropping observations with missing data, our
sample consists of 46,720 observations. In 46% of households, at least one member visited
a doctor at least once in the reference year. 37.2% of households made at least one visit to
a public doctor, while only 13% of households made at least one visit to a private doctor.
Only 20.6% of households had a member enrolled in a private health insurance plan. Among
those households who spent money on private medical care, the average expenditure was
R$68.1, or 4.5% of household income.
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between household income and overall, private, and
public doctor visits, estimated nonparametrically. Figure 3 plots the relationship between
income and expenditures on private care.6 As expected, both graphs show a positive asso-
ciation between income and private sector utilization that persists throughout the income
distribution. A more surprising ￿nding is the positive association between income and public
sector utilization that persists until approximately the mean household income of R$1,516.
Also noteworthy is the overall low level of utilization, particularly for the poor. The poorest
households make only 0.4 doctor visits per year; for an average-sized household of 4 mem-
bers, this equates to only 0.1 visits per year per individual. Even households at the high
end of the income distribution only make approximately 1 doctor visit per year, or 0.25 per
individual. These observations provide preliminary evidence that Brazil￿ s universal health
care system is not e⁄ectively reaching everyone. We next turn to regression analysis for a
5Private agents other than a HIC typically refer to physicians established in particular consultories
charging a ￿ at fee per visit. By "private" we therefore mean paid care in the SSS, as opposed to free care at
the private institutions that participate in the SUS.
6Neither ￿gure excludes households with no doctor visits/medical expenditures. For ease of viewing, we




We begin by analyzing the relationship between household income and the number of
doctor visits ￿overall, private, and public ￿by household members. All three dependent
variables have a signi￿cant number of zeros, and the process governing the transition from
non-participation to the ￿rst doctor visit is likely systematically di⁄erent than the process
governing successive doctor visits after a household is already participating in the health
care system. We therefore utilize two-part hurdle models where the ￿rst part predicts par-
ticipation and the second part predicts number of visits conditional on participation.
For the ￿rst part, we estimate the associations between income and probability of overall,
public, and private participation using a linear probability model. We avoid probit and logit
models because some speci￿cations will include almost 4,000 local area ￿xed e⁄ects, and
probit and logistic ￿xed e⁄ects estimators have been shown to su⁄er from a sizeable amount
of bias ￿even with the number of observations per group as large as it is in our dataset ￿
because of the incidental parameters problem (Kalb￿ eisch and Sprott, 1970; Hsiao, 1996;
Greene, 2004). While the linear probability model has the drawback of predicting outside
of the 0-1 range, its coe¢ cient estimates are reliable (Angrist, 2001), and the purpose of
our analysis is to accurately estimate average e⁄ects of the covariates rather than predict
outcomes.7 The regression equation is
P(visits > 0jincome;X) = ￿0 + ￿1 ln(income) + X
0￿ (1)
7Accordingly, for the models without local area ￿xed e⁄ects the linear probability model estimates for
the income coe¢ cient are virtually identical to the marginal e⁄ects from probit and logistic regressions. The
probit and logit results are available upon request.
7where visits is the number of either overall, public, or private doctor visits, income is house-
hold income, and X is a vector of control variables. We take the log of income because of
the skewness of the income distribution. This also gives the coe¢ cient for income a straight-
forward interpretation: the approximate percentage point e⁄ect on doctor visits of a 100%
increase in income. We compute heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors that allow for
clustering within each of the 3,984 local geographic areas de￿ned by the POF.8
The second part of the model estimates the relationships between the covariates and the
number of overall, public, and private doctor visits among those who cleared the participation
"hurdle" in the ￿rst step. Since the dependent variables are counts, we estimate zero-
truncated Poisson models of the form
E[visitsjincome;X;visits > 0] =
exp(￿0 + ￿1 ln(income) + X0￿)
1 ￿ P(visits = 0jincome;X)
(2)
where the sample is restricted to participators.9 In unreported regressions we also considered
truncated negative binomial models and found that the coe¢ cient estimate and standard
error for ￿1 were virtually identical to the truncated poisson in all cases. Since the coe¢ cient
estimates are di¢ cult to interpret, we also compute the marginal e⁄ect of ln(income) on visits
among participators, which we de￿ne as ￿1.
Combining the results from the two parts allows us to approximate the overall marginal







+ ￿1 (P[visits > 0]) (3)
where visitsjvisits > 0 is the mean number of visits among participators (1.73, 1.25, and
8The POF￿ s local geographic areas are de￿ned speci￿cally for the survey and do not correspond exactly
to more commonly-used geographic units. Brazil consists of 5,560 municipalities, so the POF￿ s geographic
areas are on average slightly larger than a municipality (Pan American Health Organization, 2008).
9See Greene (2007; p. 37-38) for a derivation of this model. Though the poisson ￿xed e⁄ects model
is estimated with maximum likelihood, Greene (2004) notes that it is not susceptible to the incidental
parameters problem.
81.71 for overall, private, and public) and P[visits > 0] is the sample participation rate (0.46,
0.13, and 0.37 for overall, private, and public).
We use several di⁄erent variations of the vector of controls X, starting with a regression
with no controls in which X = ? and then gradually incorporating groups of variables. We
begin by adding a set of demographic characteristics consisting of the gender, age, education,
race, and family size variables from Table 2. Since household doctor visits are directly related
to household size, we model family size ￿ exibly with a set of dummy variables.10 A common
challenge in identifying the ceteris paribus relationship between income and health care
utilization is controlling for systematic di⁄erences in health status between socioeconomic
groups. The next two sets of covariates address this issue. First is a set of health variables
that includes the underweight, overweight, and obesity indicators from Table 2 as well as the
health insurance indicator from Table 1. Since the POF does not contain more detailed health
information, we also add an extensive set of controls for living conditions consisting of number
of rooms in the family￿ s home plus the indicators for dwelling type, water source, toilet type,
electricity, and ￿ oor type. While these living condition variables are not speci￿cally health
variables, they should capture many (although obviously not all) of the mechanisms through
which a low socioeconomic status would adversely a⁄ect health. We next add the religion
variables to proxy for cultural di⁄erences that might impact medical care usage. Our last
two models include ￿xed e⁄ects ￿￿rst for each of the 27 states and then for each of the
3,984 local geographic areas.11 Given the substantial within-state variation in SUS network
accessibility shown in Figure 1, the area-level ￿xed e⁄ects are vital to capturing di⁄erences
in physician supply.
10Speci￿cally, we include a dummy variable for whether the family size is 1, another for 2, another for 3,
etc. Since few households have 10 or more members, we combine these households together into one category.
11We do not use the POF sampling weights since some of the Stata modules used in the analysis do
not support them. In unreported regressions (available upon request), we veri￿ed that the results from the
regressions for which sampling weights are supported are not sensitive to their use.
93.2 Results
Tables 3-5 present the results for number of overall, private, and public doctor visits,
respectively. Panel A of each table reports the coe¢ cient estimates and standard errors for
the income variable from the linear probability models (equation (1)), while Panel B gives the
marginal e⁄ects and standard errors for the income variable from the zero-truncated poisson
regressions (equation (2)). Column (1) represents the simple regression with ln(income) as
the only explanatory variable. The remaining columns gradually add the sets of controls,
building up to the state and local area ￿xed e⁄ects models in columns (6) and (7). In column
(8), we estimate the full area ￿xed e⁄ects model excluding the 15% of households in which
at least one member has private health insurance, thereby restricting the sample to those
who would face the full cost of private care. To conserve space, we do not report the full
regression output for the control variables but instead present F statistics from tests of the
joint statistical signi￿cance of the variables in each group.
We begin the discussion with the results for overall number of doctor visits (sum of
private and public) from Table 3. The coe¢ cient for ln(income) is positive and statistically
signi￿cant at the 0.1% level in all speci￿cations for both participation and number of visits
conditional on participation. In Panel A, the coe¢ cient estimate for ln(income) is generally
stable across columns (1)-(6) and implies that a 100% increase in income raises P(visits > 0)
by 3.3-4.6 percentage points. Adding local area ￿xed e⁄ects in columns (7)-(8) reduces the
magnitude to 2.1-2.4 percentage points. In Panel B, a 100% increase in income is associated
with an additional 0.28 doctor visits among participators in the regression with no controls.
Adding the demographic and living condition controls attenuate this relationship somewhat,
and the e⁄ect stabilizes at 0.12-0.13 visits across columns (3)-(6). Including the local area
￿xed e⁄ects in columns (7)-(8) reduces the e⁄ect further, to 0.05-0.06. The overall marginal
e⁄ect across the entire population ￿shown in the last row of the table ￿ranges from 0.11-
0.13 visits after controlling for the demographic, health, and living condition covariates
but shrinks to 0.06-0.07 visits after adding the local area ￿xed e⁄ects. To summarize, the
10evidence points to a pro-rich disparity in overall doctor visits that operates somewhat, but not
completely, through community-speci￿c factors such as the availability of physician services.
Table 4 turns to the results for private doctor visits. Ln(income) is again statistically
signi￿cant at the 0.1% level in all speci￿cations for both private participation and number of
private visits conditional on private participation. In Panel A, after adding the demographic
controls the coe¢ cient estimate for income stabilizes and implies that a 100% increase in
income is associated with a 4.7-5.6 percentage point increase in the probability a household
member visited a private network doctor. Panel B shows that a 100% increase in income
is associated with 0.09-0.22 more private visits among those households that participate in
the private medical care sector. The estimates of the overall marginal e⁄ect suggest that a
100% increase in income leads to 0.07-0.10 more private doctor visits per household across
the population. In contrast to Table 3, the local area ￿xed e⁄ects do not mitigate the
relationship between income and visits (in fact, they strengthen this relationship among
private sector participators), so the pro-rich disparity in private visits does not operate
through community-speci￿c factors.
Table 5 presents the results for public doctor visits. Importantly, despite the fact that
public sector medical care is free, there is still a positive association between income and
number of public doctor visits across columns (1)-(6). This relationship operates through an
increase in the frequency of public visits among those who participate in the public sector
(Panel B), rather than through increasing the probability of participation in the public
sector (Panel A). A 100% increase in income increases the number of public doctor visits
by participators by 0.30 in the regression with no controls. The demographic and health
controls attenuate this relationship somewhat, and the estimates stabilize at 0.11-0.14 visits
across columns (3)-(6). This translates to a population-wide marginal e⁄ect of 0.04-0.06.
Interestingly, the pro-rich disparity in public visits switches to a pro-poor disparity after
the local area ￿xed e⁄ects are added. In columns (7) and (8), a 100% increase in income
reduces the probability of public sector participation by 1.6-1.7 percentage points and has
11no statistically detectable e⁄ect on number of doctor visits among participators, leading to
an overall marginal e⁄ect of -0.02 to -0.03.
Our ￿nding of a positive relationship between income and public visits that turns negative
after accounting for local area ￿xed e⁄ects is consistent with the pro-rich disparity being
driven by the relative scarcity of public health clinics in poor, sparsely-populated areas, or
by the quality of public care being lower in these areas. Once the ￿xed e⁄ects control for
these community-level attributes, the estimates appear to re￿ ect only a substitution from
the less luxurious public network to the more luxurious private network as income increases.
At ￿rst glance, the results could also ￿t with a demand-side explanation in which rich and
poor areas di⁄er systematically in their demand for health. However, if demand-side factors
were driving the results then we would also expect to see the positive e⁄ect of income on
private doctor visits disappear after adding local area ￿xed e⁄ects, which ￿as discussed
with the results from Table 4 ￿is not the case. Multicollinearity is another conceivable
explanation, as adding detailed location controls could potentially eliminate too much of
the variation in income to obtain accurate estimates of its e⁄ect. The evidence, however,
seems to strongly rule out this possibility. First, there is no loss in precision when area ￿xed
e⁄ects are added. Second, the variance in￿ ation factor (VIF) for income in the local area
￿xed e⁄ects regression is only 3, well below the typically-accepted level of 10 at which the
extent of multicollinearity is considered to be problematic (Wooldridge, 2006:99).12 Third,
if multicollinearity in the income variable was a problem in an analysis of public visits then
it should also be a problem with private visits, but Table (4) showed that adding area ￿xed
e⁄ects made almost no di⁄erence in the estimated income e⁄ect on private visits.13
To summarize, Tables 3-5 present two pieces of evidence that the network of free public
health care providers is not e⁄ectively reaching everyone in Brazil. First, private doctor
12V IF = 1=(1 ￿ R2
j), where R2
j is the R2 from a linear regression of ln(income) on the control variables
plus the local area ￿xed e⁄ects.
13Another conceivable explanation for the positive relationship between income and public doctor visits
is if the "free" public clinics charge patients an informal fee ￿e⁄ectively a bribe ￿in order to be seen. While
there is evidence of such behavior in some developing countries (Ensor and Thompson, 2006), we are not
aware of any anecdotal or empirical evidence that these practices are common in Brazil.
12visits are a necessity instead of a luxury. Second, there is a positive relationship between
income and public sector utilization that persists through the addition of the individual-level
controls but disappears when area ￿xed e⁄ects ￿which capture local factors such as number
of public clinics ￿are added.
4 Private Medical Expenditures
4.1 Models
We next turn to an analysis of the relationship between income and total household out-
of-pocket expenditures on private medical care. This analysis also requires dealing with a
cluster of observations with zero expenditure. In the medical expenditures literature, there
is controversy over whether Heckman￿ s sample selection model or the two-part model is the
most appropriate when potential expenditure is the main outcome of interest (see Madden,
2008 and Jones, 2000). However, our main outcome of interest is actual expenditure ￿the
expenses Brazilians actually spent on health care, rather the expenses they would spend had
they sought health care. Dow and Norton (2003) underscore that the appropriate model in
this case is the two-part model as no selection bias is actually present in the sample.14
We therefore estimate the e⁄ect of income on medical expenditures using the following
two-part model:
P[y > 0jincome;X] = ￿0 + ￿1 ln(income) + X
0￿2 (4)
E[ln(y)jy > 0;income;X] = ￿0 + ￿1 ln(income) + X
0￿2 (5)
where y is out-of-pocket household medical expenses while income and X again represent
household income and the vector of controls. We again estimate a linear probability model
14Sometimes this is referred as the "true zeros" case in the literature, since a zero expenditure observation
represents no consumption, and not an unobserved value.
13in the ￿rst part (equation (4)) to avoid the incidental parameters problem; in unreported
regressions (available upon request) we veri￿ed that the marginal e⁄ects in the ￿rst part are
virtually identical using probit or logit models. We estimate the second part (equation (5))
with ordinary least squares (OLS) using the 8,024 observations with y > 0. By combining
the results from the two parts we can compute the marginal e⁄ect of ln(income) on the







+ ￿1 (P[y > 0]) (6)
where P[y > 0] is the proportion of the sample with non-zero expenditures, which is 0.17,
and ln(y)jy > 0 is the mean log of expenditures among participators, which is 5.48. This
derivative can be interpreted as the approximate income elasticity of medical expenditures
at the mean.15
As with doctor visits, we estimate the model ￿rst with no control variables and then
gradually build up to the area ￿xed e⁄ects speci￿cation. We again also estimate the area ￿xed
e⁄ects model dropping those households where at least one individual has health insurance,
which restricts the sample to those for whom all expenditures are out-of-pocket costs.
4.2 Results
Table 6 reports the results. Panel A presents the results from the participation equation
(4), while panel B presents the results from the expenditure equation (5). The last row of
the table combines the estimates from Panels A and B to obtain the income elasticity.
In all speci￿cations, we ￿nd a positive and statistically signi￿cant relationship between
income and both probability of paticipation and expenditures conditional on participation.
In Panel A, the ￿rst three sets of control variables attenuate the relationship between income
15In unreported regressions we veri￿ed that our estimated elasticities are very similar to the coe¢ cient
estimates from a log-log model with the full sample. (In order to estimate a log-log model with the full
sample, we add 1 to y so than ln(y) is de￿ned even for those with no medical expenditures.)
14and participation somewhat, but from columns (4)-(8) the estimate stabilizes at 0.051-0.056.
A 100% increase in income therefore increases the probability of participation in the private
sector by approximately 5.1 to 5.6 percentage points. Panel B shows that after the living
condition controls are added in column (4) the estimated relationship between ln(income)
and y among those with non-zero expenditures ranges from 0.15-0.19. Combining the results
from Panels A and B yields estimated income elasticities that are consistently well below 1.
After the living condition controls are added in column (4), the elasticity remains within the
0.32-0.33 range regardless of whether additional controls or ￿xed e⁄ects are included or those
with health insurance are dropped from the sample. Private medical spending is therefore
a necessity instead of a luxury, providing further evidence to support the hypothesis that
individuals living in poor (generally remote) areas spend money on private care because of
a lack of access or quality in the public sector.
5 Disparities and the Family Health Program
We close our empirical analysis by examining whether income-based disparities in health
care utilization are systematically di⁄erent in states with higher rates of Family Health Pro-
gram (PSF) coverage.16 The Brazilian government created the PSF in 1994 in an e⁄ort to
improve primary health care access and reduce service inequality. The PSF assigns a geo-
graphical area inhabited by an average of 3,450 and a maximum of 4,500 people to a team
composed of one physician, one nurse, one nurse assistant, and four or more community
health workers. While PSF physicians and nurses typically provide care at health facilities,
community workers provide prevention and education services during household visits. Al-
though the program was initiated at a national level in 1994, its expansion has occurred
gradually over time since then (Macinko et al., 2006). According to o¢ cial data from the
Brazilian Department of Health, by our survey year of 2003 the PSF covered 29% of Brazil-
16Ideally, we would like to test for di⁄ereneces on the basis of local area PSF coverage, but data limitations
prevent such an analysis because we do not know which speci￿c areas are represented by each local area
indicator.
15ian families. Some studies suggest the PSF has improved health care access to vulnerable
sectors of the population such as the poor and elderly (Macinko et al., 2006; Thume et al.,
2010; Goldbaum et al., 2005; Fernandes et al., 2009), but others have been unable to ￿nd
evidence that the PSF has reduced health service inequality (see for example Morsch et al.,
2001; Barros and Bertoldi, 2008).
Testing whether the e⁄ects of income on doctor visits and medical expenditures di⁄er
systematically on the basis of PSF coverage is important, as the PSF has continued to
expand since 2003 with the intention of eventually achieving full coverage of the Brazilian
population. If there are no income-based disparities in health care utilization in areas covered
by the PSF, then once the entire country is covered the disparities observed in this paper
will disappear. In that case, the policy implication of our results would simply be that the
government should continue doing what it is already doing. If, however, disparities remain
even in the most heavily covered areas, additional programs or a modi￿cation of the PSF
may be needed to improve access in poor areas.17
We test for heterogeneity on the basis of state PSF coverage in two ways. First,
we re-estimate our hurdle Poisson and two-part models adding an interaction term for
ln(income)*state PSF coverage rate. A negative and signi￿cant coe¢ cient estimate for the
interaction term would indicate that disparities are smaller in states with extensive PSF
coverage, and vice versa. Second, we split Brazil￿ s 27 states into three categories: the 9
with the lowest PSF coverage rates, the 9 with the highest PSF coverage rates, and the 9 in
the middle. We then estimate our hurdle Poisson and two-part models for each of the three
subsamples. Our o¢ cial data on 2003 state PSF coverage rates come from the Brazilian
Ministry of Health.18 The proportion of families covered by PSF in the average state is 0.29.
This coverage rate ranges from a minimum of 0.07 in the Federal District to a maximum of
0.76 in Piau￿. The proportion of families covered averages only 0.17 in the 9 states with the
17Examining heterogeneity on the basis of PSF coverage also helps to rule out the possibility that the
observed pro-rich disparity in doctor visits re￿ ects substitution away from doctor visits toward in-home visits
from community health workers in PSF-covered areas.
18The data are publicly available at http://www2.datasus.gov.br/DATASUS/index.php
16lowest coverage rates, compared to 0.38 in the 9 with medium coverage rates and 0.62 in the
9 with high coverage rates.
Tables 7 and 8 present the results for the regressions with the interaction term and the
regressions for the subsamples. To conserve space we report only the results including all the
control variables plus state ￿xed e⁄ects, as these are most complete speci￿cations for which
disparities persisted for all the dependent variables in Sections 3 and 4. The conclusions
reached are similar using the other speci￿cations (results available upon request). In Table
7, the interaction term is insigni￿cant in all regressions and its coe¢ cient estimate is never
large enough to conclude that the pro-rich disparities would even come close to disappearing
at 100% coverage. In Table 8, there is no clear pattern of systematic di⁄erences in disparities
on the basis of PSF coverage.
6 Conclusion
In its Constitution of 1988, Brazil adopted a universal health care policy with the goal
of guaranteeing public health care to the most vulnerable sectors of the population. To
implement this policy, the government expanded the public service network substantially
and created the Family Health Program. Previous research suggests that Brazil￿ s universal
health care system has improved health and access to health care (Macinko et al., 2006
and 2007; Rasella et al., 2010; Morsch et al., 2001; Goldbaum et al., 2005). Despite this
progress, our paper presents two pieces of evidence that the public health care network is
still not e⁄ectively reaching the segments of the population that need it most. First, we ￿nd
a pro-rich disparity in doctor visits not only in the private sector but also in the free public
sector. The disparity in the public sector disappears after adding local area ￿xed e⁄ects,
suggesting it is driven by inadequate quantity or quality of public health care providers in
poor remote areas. Second, we estimate the income elasticities of private doctor visits and
private medical expenditures and ￿nd that private sector care remains a necessity despite
17the availability of free public care, again pointing to inadequate access to high-quality public
care.
Our results point to possible improvements to Brazil￿ s health care system. Considering
that hospitals, clinics, and even basic health units may not be cost-e⁄ective in the least
densely-populated areas, the deployment of health workers to those areas seems to be the
key. Whether the PSF is the appropriate model remains an open question, the answer to
which requires further research using data at a ￿ner geographical level. Were the PSF found
insu¢ cient, community-based interventions would need to be reformulated. This could be
done by either reducing the geographical area assigned to each PSF team or by targeting
the most vulnerable groups within each area exclusively, instead of attempting to cover all
households. Programs destined to increase participation and educate the population on
the bene￿ts of the PSF are another valuable strategy. Finally, improved e¢ cacy could be
achieved by integrating private doctors with o¢ ces in remote areas to the SUS network.
Our ￿ndings also contribute to the broader debate over the government￿ s role as a provider
and payer of medical services by showing that universal coverage does not automatically lead
to universal care. Even if a population is shielded from medical bills, high transportation
costs can still prevent the poor from obtaining care. Government e⁄orts to achieve equal
access should not only focus on subsidizing medical care for the poor but also ensuring a
su¢ cient supply of providers in underserved areas. This is especially di¢ cult in countries
with a large geographic territory and limited tax revenue, such as Brazil.
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25Table 2 ￿Summary Statistics for Control Variables
Variable Description Mean (Std. Dev.)
Female Share of females 15 to 60 years old in household 0:326 (0:219)
Age 1 Share of infants (￿10 years old) in household 0:176 (0:208)
Age 2 Share of elderly (￿60 years old) in household 0:123 (0:267)
Education Highest education years of any household member 7:858 (4:190)
White 1(modal race of household members is white) 0:464 (0:499)
Black 1(modal race of household members is black) 0:047 (0:212)
Mixed 1(modal race of household members is mixed) 0:483 (0:500)
Family Size Number of members in household 3:778 (1:896)
Underweight 1(anyone in household is underweight (BMI￿ 18:5)) 0:103 (0:305)
Overweight 1(anyone in household is overweight (25 ￿BMI< 30)) 0:484 (0:500)
Obese 1(anyone in household is obese (BMI￿ 30)) 0:193 (0:395)
Rooms Number of rooms in home 5:812 (2:245)
Dwelling Type (omitted category is other type of house)
Dwelling 1 1(rudimentary house) 0:062 (0:241)
Dwelling 2 1(apartment or single-room dwelling) 0:060 (0:238)
Water Source (omitted category is public network with home plumbing)
Water 1 1(well or other source with home plumbing) 0:145 (0:352)
Water 2 1(public network without home plumbing) 0:046 (0:210)
Water 3 1(well or other source without home plumbing) 0:130 (0:337)
Sewage (omitted category is sewage network)
Sewage 1 1(septic tank) 0:203 (0:402)
Sewage 2 1(rudimentary tank) 0:335 (0:472)
Sewage 3 1(other source) 0:054 (0:226)
Sewage 4 1(no sewage) 0:094 (0:291)
Electricity (omitted category is has power source)
Electricity 1 1(no power source) 0:057 (0:232)
Floor Type (omitted category is carpet)
Floor 1 1(ceramic, tile, or stone) 0:382 (0:486)
Floor 2 1(treated wood) 0:114 (0:318)
Floor 3 1(cement) 0:426 (0:494)
Floor 4 1(other ￿ oor type) 0:064 (0:245)
Religion (omitted category is atheist)
Religion 1 1(Catholic) 0:779 (0:415)
Religion 2 1(evangelical) 0:151 (0:358)
Religion 3 1(other religion) 0:021 (0:142)
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